Any tool which is heavily used suffers wear overtime. It’s dinged. It’s bent. It rusts or warps. Without care, the tool may corrode to a point where it no longer performs its function. Maintaining a tool keeps it strong and serves its original purpose.
So it is – it seems – with case law. The more consequential (or useful) a particular holding, the more it’s cited. The more it’s cited, the more it’s applied in the new and different factual circumstances. It’s bent a little here and twisted a little there. Before long, the case law has to be restored to keep it strong and serve its original purpose.
Restoring case law to its original purpose is what the amicus brief authored by Katie Johnson and Dylan Lewis and the ultimate Colorado Supreme Court decision in Pinto v. USAA (26SA29) were all about. Samantha Pinto sued USAA for bad faith handling of her UM/UIM claim. USAA sought customary discovery (unredacted prior medical records and an independent medical examination). Pinto’s counsel resisted that discovery, citing two heavily used items of case law for propositions bent away from their original meaning.
First, Pinto’s counsel offered Schultz v. GEICO Cas. Co. (2018 CO 87, 429 P.3d 844) for the notion that because USAA never sought an independent medical exam or unredacted medical records investigating the claim before litigation, they’re not entitled to them during litigation. Such a ruling might have been appropriate in Schultz because it involved a claim in which the policy limits had already been paid. Samantha Pinto, however, also filed a breach of contract claim which is – by its nature – an ongoing claim dispute. Denying USAA medical records or an independent medical exam in the context of Ms. Pinto’s ongoing claim would ultimately deny insurance companies discovery tools that other litigants are provided by the court rules. The Colorado Supreme Court restored Schultz to its original purpose, holding its rule does not apply when a breach of contract claim (an ongoing UM/UIM claim value dispute) is being litigated.
Second, Pinto’s counsel offered Charlson v. Pribble, No. 25SA281, 2026 WL 31984 (Colo. Jan. 5, 2026) (unpublished order) as grounds for not having to undergo the independent medical examination concerning her claimed TBI and resulting cognitive deficits. Pribble’s original holding protected plaintiffs who pled generic, often called “garden variety,” damage claims for mental suffering; that such a claim did not place the plaintiff’s brain health in controversy in a way that subjects her to a full brain-injury level of independent neuro-psychological examination. Samantha Pinto, however, did not merely plead a generic claim of mental suffering but, rather, pled a concussion with resulting sleep disturbance and cognitive deficits. The Colorado Supreme Court restored Pribble to its original purpose, holding that Ms. Pinto did place her brain health in controversy entitling USAA to an appropriate independent medical examination.
In the Pinto holding, the Colorado Supreme Court maintained both Schultz and Pribble, restoring each to serve its original purpose.
